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ABSTRACT  
 
This article examines a proposed legislative response to Skilling v. United States, a response 
approved by the Senate but never voted on by the House. It argues that federal mail fraud 
prosecutions disgrace American criminal justice and that amending the mail fraud statute to 
proscribe “undisclosed self-dealing” would make them worse.  
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TERRIBLE TOOLS FOR PROSECUTORS: NOTES ON SENATOR LEAHY’S 
PROPOSAL TO “FIX” SKILLING V. UNITED STATES 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In 2010, Senator Patrick Leahy, the Chairman of the Senate Judiciary 
Committee, denounced Supreme Court’s recent decision in Skilling v. 
United States1 and proposed restoring 20-year penalties for what he called 
“undisclosed self-dealing.” In 2012, the Senate approved Senator Leahy’s 
proposal without significant opposition, and the House Judiciary Committee 
endorsed the proposal unanimously. Because the majority leader of the 
House failed to bring it to a vote, however, the 112th Congress ended 
without enacting Senator Leahy’s proposal. Congress continues to consider 
its response to Skilling.  
This article maintains that Senator Leahy’s proposal would make federal 
mail fraud prosecutions even more dreadful than they already are. 
Congress’s near approval of this measure without notable criticism or 
opposition reveals an institution in which ill considered posturing on 
criminal justice issues still goes unchallenged.  
 
I. BACKGROUND: FROM MAIL FRAUD TO MCNALLY TO THE “HONEST 
SERVICES” STATUTE TO SKILLING 
 
The federal mail fraud statute, enacted in 1872, was the first statute to 
“federalize” crimes against private individuals that formerly had been 
prosecuted only by state and local authorities. The statute was aimed, not at 
dishonest government officials, but at swindlers who used the mails to 
peddle things like phony western mining stock.2 The statute forbids 
“devis[ing] any scheme or artifice to defraud” and then placing something 
in the mail for the purpose of executing the scheme.3 As the Supreme Court 
recognized in 1999, the 1872 statute did no more than incorporate 
traditional concepts of fraud.4 Fraud, a common law tort, consists of causing 
someone to part with his property or to act in other disadvantageous ways 
by lying.5 
1 130 S. Ct. 2896 (2010). 
2 The sponsor of the measure declared that it would “prevent the frauds which are 
mostly gotten up in the cities . . . by thieves, forgers, and rapscallions generally, for the 
purpose of deceiving and fleecing the innocent people in the country.” See McNally v. 
United States, 483 U.S. 350, 356 (1987) (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 3d Sess., 35 
(1870) (remarks of Rep. Farnsworth)).  
3 18 U.S.C. § 1341.  
4 See Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 22-24 (1999).  
5 A treatise published shortly after Congress enacted the mail fraud statute described 
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Federal prosecutors pressed courts to stretch the statute, and particularly 
in the 1970s, they did. By 1987, nearly every federal court of appeals had 
held that the statute outlawed deprivations of “the intangible right of honest 
services,” and none had rejected this conclusion.6 These courts agreed that 
accepting a bribe or kickback deprived the public of its intangible right to 
honest services, and they said that other things did too. As the Supreme 
Court observed in Skilling, however, they were in “considerable disarray” 
about what the other things were.7 
In 1987, the Supreme Court called a halt, one that turned out to be 
fleeting. In McNally v. United States,8 the Court held that the mail fraud 
statute outlawed deprivations of property, not of an ill-defined intangible 
right to honest services. 
At the time of McNally, federal law had prohibited the bribery of federal 
officials for more than a century,9 and Congress had made it a federal crime 
to bribe state and local officials three years earlier.10 Dissatisfied with these 
straightforward prohibitions of bribery and the numerous other devices it 
had for prosecuting dishonest officials,11 the Justice Department 
complained that McNally had deprived it of an important tool in its fight 
against government corruption. It sought restoration of the honest-services 
gimmick, and Congress speedily complied. It enacted a new section of the 
mail fraud statute that read in full, “For the purposes of this chapter, the 
term ‘scheme or artifice to defraud’ includes a scheme or artifice to deprive 
the elements of this tort: 
 
It is a general rule of law that, in order to obtain redress or relief from the 
injurious consequences of deceit, it is necessary for the complaining party 
to prove that his adversary has made a false representation of material facts; 
that he made it with knowledge of its falsity; that the complaining party was 
ignorant of its falsity, and believed it to be true; that it was made with intent 
that it should be acted upon; and that it was acted upon by the complaining 
party to his damage. 
 
MELVILLE M. BIGELOW, THE LAW OF FRAUD 1 (1877). 
6 See McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 362-64 & nn.1-3 (1987) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting); United States v. Ochs, 842 F.2d 515, 521 (1st Cir. 1988). 
7 Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2929.  
8 483 U.S. 350 (1987). 
9 See Dixson v. United States, 465 U.S. 462, 491 (1984); 18 U.S.C. § 201. 
10 See 18 U.S.C. § 666 (prohibiting the bribery of any official of a state or local 
government that receives $10,000 or more per year in federal benefits, as almost every state 
and local government does).  
11 See 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (the Hobbs Act); 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (the Travel Act); 18 U.S.C. 
§§ 1961-62 (RICO); 18 U.S.C. § 1956 (the Money Laundering Control Act); 26 U.S.C. § 
7201 (tax evasion).  
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another of the intangible right of honest services.”12  
Although the statute did not define the critical term, no Member of 
Congress appears to have said, “This thing is gibberish, and I won’t vote for 
it.”13 As William Stuntz observed, “[T]he story of American criminal law is 
a story of tacit cooperation between prosecutors and legislators, each of 
whom benefits from more and broader crimes.” 14 
The Supreme Court did not consider either the meaning or the 
constitutionality of the honest-services statute until Skilling v. United States 
in 2010. By that time, the government was able to cite substantial authority 
for the proposition that the statute proscribed “undisclosed self-dealing.”15  
Although the government urged the Supreme Court to approve this 
standard, the Court not only rejected it but also took the unusual step of 
warning Congress that legislation approving it might be held 
unconstitutional.16 In an opinion by Justice Ginsburg, the Court declared 
that it could save the honest-services statute from a “vagueness shoal”17 
only by confining it to the “solid core” that all the lower courts had 
recognized.18 The Court held, “[H]onest-services fraud does not encompass 
conduct more wide-ranging than the paradigmatic cases of bribes and 
kickbacks. . . . [N]o other misconduct falls within § 1346’s province.”19 
Three justices—Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Kennedy—would have held 
the statute unconstitutionally vague.20  
 
II.  THE HISTORY OF SENATOR LEAHY’S PROPOSAL SO FAR 
 
Soon after Skilling, Senator Patrick Leahy, the Chairman of the Senate 
Judiciary Committee, declared that the Supreme Court had “sided with an 
Enron executive convicted of fraud” and “undermined Congressional efforts 
to protect hardworking Americans from powerful interests.”21 Although the 
12 18 U.S.C. § 1346.  
13 What became the honest services statute was joined with new mandatory minimum 
sentences in an omnibus drug control bill. The House approved this measure by a vote of 
375 to 30 and the Senate by a vote of 87 to 3. Library of Congress, Bill Summary and 
Status, 100th Cong., H.R. 5210, available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/bdquery/z?d100:HR05210:@@@R. 
14 William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 
505, 510 (2001). 
15 See Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2932.  
16 Id. at 2933 n.44.  
17 Id. at 2907. 
18 Id. at 2930. 
19 Id. at 2933. 
20 See id. at 2935 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).  
21 Statement of Senator Patrick Leahy, RESTORING KEY TOOLS TO COMBAT FRAUD 
AND CORRUPTION AFTER THE SUPREME COURT’S SKILLING DECISION, HEARING BEFORE 
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senator’s denunciation of Skilling might be regarded as just the way 
politicians talk, consider for a moment how tawdry this talk is. In Skilling, 
the Supreme Court struggled to salvage and make sense of an apparently 
incomprehensible statute. As Senator Leahy described it, however, every 
member of a unanimous Court—Ruth Bader Ginsburg as well as Antonin 
Scalia—had sided with a dishonest Enron executive and powerful interests 
against hardworking Americans.22  
To repair the damage wrought by Skilling, Senator Leahy introduced a 
measure he called “The Honest Services Restoration Act.”23 The Senate 
Judiciary Committee held a very brief hearing on this proposal. It styled this 
hearing “Restoring Key Tools to Combat Fraud and Corruption After the 
Supreme Court’s Skilling Decision.”24  
Members of Congress often speak of giving “tools” to prosecutors.25 
They never speak of giving “tools” to defense attorneys and rarely speak of 
doing justice. 
THE S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY at 1, 111th Cong. (2010).  
22 The defendant in Skilling was indeed “an Enron executive convicted of fraud.” 
23 S.3854, 111th Cong. (2010), available at 
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/111/s3854/text.  This initial version of Senator 
Leahy’s proposal would have outlawed undisclosed self-dealing not only by public 
officials but also by the officers and directors of publicly traded corporations and private 
charities. The version later approved by the Senate would have proscribed self-dealing only 
by public officials. This article does not consider Senator Leahy’s proposal for restricting 
self-dealing by private individuals.  
24 See RESTORING KEY TOOLS, supra note .   
25 The full title of the USA Patriot Act is the Uniting and Strengthening America by 
Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001. 
See Pub. L. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001). The full title of the PROTECT Act is the 
Prosecutorial Remedies and Tools Against the Exploitation of Children Today Act of 2003. 
See Pub. L. No. 10-821, 117 Stat. 650 (2003).  
Prosecutors seem unembarrassed to request new “tools” and offended when existing 
“tools” are threatened. After Attorney General Eric Holder endorsed the reduction of some 
mandatory minimum sentences, the National Association of Assistant United States 
Attorneys sent a public letter of protest: 
 
[M]andatory minimum sentences are a critical tool in persuading defendants to 
cooperate, thereby enabling law enforcement officers to dismantle large drug 
organizations and violent gangs. Present law provides numerous opportunities 
for deserving defendants to avoid mandatory sentences through: cooperation in 
providing information about other criminals and criminal enterprises; plea 
bargaining, which resolves the vast majority of federal cases; [and other 
mechanisms]. 
 
Letter from the National Association of Assistant United States Attorneys to the Hon. Eric 
H. Holder, Jr., Jan. 27, 2014, available at http://www.mainjustice.com/wp-
admin/documents-databases/187-1-NAAUSA-leter-to-Holder.pdf.  
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In written statements submitted to the committee, two criminal defense 
attorneys maintained that prosecutors had abundant tools already.26 The 
only witnesses actually to appear before the committee were a 
representative of the Justice Department and three former federal 
prosecutors.  
One of these witnesses, George J. Terwilliger III, endorsed a Skilling 
“fix” somewhat tentatively. He suggested that the issue required further 
study and that legislation prohibiting undisclosed self-dealing might better 
be located outside the mail fraud statute.27  
The other witnesses were less hesitant. University of Florida Law 
Professor Michael L. Seigel complained, for example, that Skilling had left 
the federal government unable to convict of mail fraud (1) a state prosecutor 
who prosecuted an alleged murderer without disclosing the prosecutor’s 
friendship with the murder victim, (2) a state legislator who sponsored 
legislation aiding his alma mater in language that did not make the identity 
of the benefitted university clear, and (3) “a disturbed employee of the 
Department of Homeland Security who exaggerates a threat for the sheer 
evil pleasure of causing a public panic.”28  
According to a member of Senator Leahy’s staff, the senator’s proposal 
languished for a time because Republicans were concerned about 
prosecutorial misconduct that had occurred in the case of their late 
colleague, Senator Ted Stevens29—misconduct that led the Justice 
Department to dismiss the prosecution after Stevens had been convicted and 
lost his seat.30  
By 2012, however, Leahy’s proposal had substantial bipartisan support. 
Its sponsors in the House were James Sensenbrenner, the conservative 
Republican Chairman of the Criminal Justice Subcommittee of the Judiciary 
Committee, and Mike Quigley, a liberal Democrat. The House Judiciary 
Committee approved it by a vote of 30 to 0.31 
The Senate Judiciary Committee also approved the measure. Senator 
Leahy, a liberal democrat, and Senator John Cornyn, a conservative 
26 See RESTORING KEY TOOLS, supra note , at 48-61.  
27 Id. at 18-27.  
28 Id. at 17.   
29 Conversation with Noah Bookbinder, Chief Counsel on Criminal Justice of the 
Senate Committee on the Judiciary, N.Y. City, Mar. 25, 2011. 
30 See Carrie Johnson & Del Quentin Wilbur, Holder Asks Judge to Drop Case Against 
Ex-Senator: Justice Department Cites Prosecutors’ Behavior During Stevens Trial, WASH. 
POST, Apr. 2, 2009, at A1; Del Quentin Wilbur, Judge in Stevens Dismissal Known for 
Tenacity, WASH. POST, Apr. 10, 2009, at A3.   
31 See Library of Congress, Bill Summary and Status, 112th Cong., H.R. 2572, 
available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d112:h.r.2572 (last visited Feb. 20, 
2012).     
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Republican, then offered it as an amendment to the STOCK Act, a bill 
whose main purpose was to prohibit insider trading by members of 
Congress. The Senate adopted the Leahy-Cornyn amendment by voice vote 
and then approved the bill 96 to 3.32  
Both the New York Times and the Washington Post endorsed the Leahy-
Cornyn amendment. Neither paper offered any argument or analysis beyond 
the Times’ claim that the amendment was “badly needed . . . to better 
prosecute corruption”33 and the Post’s declaration that it “would restore 
prosecutors’ ability to go after official corruption.”34 All anyone needed to 
know was that the amendment was an anti-corruption measure and that 
corruption makes people very angry.  
Bucking a strong political tide, the majority leader of the House, 
Republican Eric Cantor, did not include the Leahy-Cornyn proposal in the 
version of the STOCK Act he brought to a vote.35 After the House approved 
this version, the majority leader of the Senate, Democrat Harry Reid, 
blamed Republicans for blocking a conference committee to resolve 
differences between the two chambers’ bills. Following a vote for closure, 
the Senate approved the House-approved measure by unanimous consent.36 
The STOCK Act signed by the President did not include the Leahy 
proposal.37 
 
III. CRIMINALIZING UNDISCLOSED SELF-DEALING 
 
As approved by the Senate, the Leahy proposal would create a new form 
of mail fraud—“undisclosed self-dealing.”38 At the core of the proposed 
statute is a definition of this term. Unsurprisingly, the conduct proscribed by 
the statute would have two elements—self-dealing and non-disclosure. 
First, an official must “act for the purpose, in whole or in material part,” 
of furthering his own financial interest or that of any of a number of other 
people or organizations. They include his spouse, his minor child, his 
32 Congress Moves on Ethics, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 2012, at A20.  
33 Id. 
34 The Senate Bids to Tighten Up on Insider Trading, WASH. POST, Feb. 6, 2012, at 
A14. Both papers rejected an op-ed opposing the measure by former attorney general 
Edwin C. Meese III and me.  
35 See Sung Min Kim, Eric Cantor Under Fire for STOCK Act Tweaks, POLITICO, Feb. 
8, 20120, available at http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0212/72624.html.  
36 See Robert Pear, Insider Trading Ban for Lawmakers Clears Congress, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 22, 2012, at A13. 
37 See Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge Act of 2012, 126 Stat. 291 (2012).   
38 The bill declares that “the term ‘scheme or artifice to defraud’ . . . includes a scheme 
or artifice by a public official to engage undisclosed self-dealing.” See Congressional 
Record, Feb. 2, 2012, 112th Cong., available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/query/F?r112:1:./temp/~r112h08WqO:e25901:. [improve this cite] 
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business partner, and any person or organization from whom or which he 
“has received anything of value.”39 Although the proposal borrows the term 
self-dealing from the law of fiduciary obligation, it reaches conduct the law 
has not regarded as self-dealing before. Every agent must act in the interest 
of people he serves and not in his own self-interest,40 but self-dealing 
means self-dealing. Fiduciaries are not barred from contracting with people 
from whom they have received things of value, need not recuse themselves 
from decisions affecting the interests of these people, and need not disclose 
everything of value they have received.  
Second, the official must knowingly falsify, conceal, cover-up, or fail to 
disclose “material information that is required to be disclosed by any 
Federal, State, or local statute, rule, regulation or charter applicable to the 
39 The list also includes any business or organization of which the official is an 
employee, officer, director, trustee, or general partner; any individual, business or 
organization with whom or which he has any arrangement for employment or financial 
compensation; and any individual, business or organization with whom or which he is 
currently negotiating for employment or financial compensation. 
The most sweeping item on the statutory list—anyone from whom the official “has 
received anything of value”—has an exception, and the exception has confused some 
readers. The proposed statute refers to receiving “anything of value, otherwise than as 
provided by law for the proper discharge of official duty, or by rule or regulation.”  
The first part of this language—“otherwise than as provided by law for the proper 
discharge of official duty”—was apparently drawn from the federal gratuity statute, 18 
U.S.C. § 201(c). The phrase refers to the payment of an official’s salary or other authorized 
compensation for his official work. The added words “or by rule or regulation” probably 
refer to payment of the official’s salary or other authorized compensation as well. The 
draftsman might have added these words to make clear that “provided by law” does not 
refer to statutory law alone; rules and regulations count too.  
The placement of the additional words, however, is odd. The bill does not say 
“otherwise than as provided by statute, rule or regulation for the proper discharge of 
official duty”; it says “otherwise than as provided by law for the proper discharge of 
official duty, or by rule or regulation.” This placement has led some readers to conclude 
that the bill does not reach payments authorized by any rule or regulation even when the 
payments are not compensation for the performance of an official duty.  
For example, a regulation prohibiting lobbyists from buying legislators’ meals might 
allow lobbyists to host social events at which appetizers are served. See 5 CFR § 
2635.203(b)(1). Some readers have thought that the bill would then exempt the receipt of 
appetizers because their receipt is “authorized by rule or regulation.”  
This reading seems improbable. Exempting conduct from a prohibition does not 
“authorize” it for all purposes or exempt it from other prohibitions. Under the bill, a 
legislator’s knowing violation of a law requiring the disclosure of a lobbyist’s appetizers 
could be the predicate of a federal mail fraud prosecution if the legislator later acted to 
favor the appetizer provider’s financial interests.   
40 See John H. Langbein, Questioning the Trust Law Duty of Loyalty: Sole Interest or 
Best Interest, 114 YALE L.J. 929, 958-63 (2005). Moreover, under the law of trusts, 
“transactions involving trust property entered into by a trustee for the trustee’s own 
personal account [are] voidable without further proof.” Unif. Trust Code § 802 comment.  
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public official.”  
The word material in the phrase material information that is required to 
be disclosed does not mean what the word usually means in mail fraud 
prosecutions—having “a natural tendency to influence or [being] capable of 
influencing [a] decision.”41 Instead, the bill defines “material information” 
as any information concerning the official’s own financial interest (when he 
is alleged to have furthered his interest) or any information regarding his 
“association, connection, or dealings with” anyone from whom he has 
received something of value (when he is alleged to have furthered a 
benefactor’s interest).42 
 
IV. THE FIRST ELEMENT: SELF-DEALING 
 
A.  The Ubiquity of Self-Dealing 
 
Self-dealing sounds sneaky, but public officials cannot avoid it. Every 
legislator engages in what the Leahy proposal calls self-dealing many times 
each year. A legislator who votes to reduce taxes, for example, “performs 
an official act for the purpose, in whole or material part, of furthering or 
benefitting a financial interest” of everyone on the statutory list—himself, 
his spouse, his employer, his business partner, and every person from whom 
he ever has accepted a beer, a fruitcake, an honorarium, or a fee for 
professional services. 
Legislators commonly take official action to advance the financial 
interests of large groups of people. They approve bank bailouts, farm 
subsidies, tax breaks, rate increases, Medicare benefits, limits on credit card 
fees, and more. The benefitted groups are very likely to include people who 
have given things of value to the legislators. In addition, they are likely to 
include spouses, children, employers, business partners, and the legislators 
themselves. Under the Leahy proposal, any action taken to benefit a group 
that includes any of these people is self-dealing (although the self-dealing 
may be lawful either because the official has disclosed it or because no law 
requires its disclosure).43   
41 See Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 16 (1999). 
42 See Congressional Record, Feb. 2, 2012, 112th Cong., available at 
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/F?r112:3:./temp/~r1129FkULN:e256323:.  [Improve 
this cite.]  
Although Senator Leahy’s proposal would criminalize only conduct by public 
officials, donors and others could be prosecuted for conspiring with the officials and for 
complicity in their crimes. 
43 State regulations sometimes prohibit action to benefit an official’s financial interest 
when “the effect on that interest . . . is greater than the effect on a substantial class of 
persons to which the [official] belongs as a member of a profession, occupation, industry or 
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B.  The Uncertain Status of Campaign Contributions 
 
Skilling warned, “If Congress were to take up the enterprise of 
criminalizing ‘undisclosed self-dealing by a public official . . . ,’ it would 
have to employ standards of sufficient definiteness and specificity to 
overcome due process concerns.”44 Senator Leahy therefore claimed on 
various occasions that his bill was “precise, careful legislation,”45 that it 
was “carefully drafted to avoid ambiguity and lend certainty to the anti-
corruption law,”46 and that it had “unusual depth and precision in its 
definitions.”47 Leahy made this claim even of the version of the bill he 
initially introduced—one so ineptly drafted that it would not have 
accomplished its purpose48—and of the patched but ungrammatical version 
approved by the Senate.49  
region.” See, e.g., Alaska Stat. § 24.60.030(g) (2012); R.I. Gen. Laws § 36-14-7(b) (2012). 
The Leahy proposal, however, has no comparable language. Benefitting a benefactor even 
as a member of a profession or other large group appears to be self-dealing. 
44 130 S. Ct. at 2933 n.44. 
45 Press Release, Senate Judiciary Committee Hearing Looks at Scope of Skilling 
Decision, Sept. 28, 2010, available at 
http://www.leahy.senate.gov/press/press_releases/release/?id=d8b2c597-548f-49cc-aaa9-
9a888  jjj88333dfdtgyyb bnbgy7cb8792a8.  
46 Press Release, Leahy, Casey Urge Senate Leaders to Push for Conference 
Committee on STOCK Act, Feb. 12, 2012, available at 
http://www.leahy.senate.gov/press/press_releases/?id=31e50b7f-Idab-4f1a-9419-
dbbe35094439.  
47 Press Release, Comments of Senator Patrick Leahy on Public Corruption 
Amendment and the STOCK Act, Feb. 9, 2012, available at 
http://www.leahy.senate.gov/press/press_releases/release/?id=FA2892E5-FA31-42A0-
A2DC-50BAD999942D.  
48 See S.3854, 111th Cong. (2010). This bill declared that a public official engages in 
undisclosed self-dealing when he performs an official act for the purpose, in whole or in 
part, of furthering a financial interest of a person from whom he has received a thing of 
value and knowingly fails to disclose “material information regarding that financial interest 
in a manner that is required by any Federal, State, or local statute, rule, regulation or 
charter applicable to the public official.” What statutes, rules, and regulations may require 
officials to disclose, however, are, not the “financial interests” of their benefactors, but the 
“things of value” the officials have received from them. Apparently no member of 
Congress or Congressional staffer noticed this glitch until I mentioned it at a conference 
attended by the Chief Counsel on Criminal Justice of the Senate Judiciary Committee on 
March 25, 2011. I should learn to keep my mouth shut.   
49 Note the shift from verb to noun in this version’s description of the second element 
of undisclosed-self dealing: “and (B) the public official knowingly falsifies, conceals, or 
covers up material information that is required to be disclosed by any Federal, State, or 
local statute, rule, regulation, or charter applicable to the public official, or the knowing 
failure of the public official to disclose material information in a manner that is required by 
any Federal, State, or local statute, rule, regulation, or charter applicable to the public 
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Although the Leahy proposal seems sufficiently precise to satisfy due 
process requirements,50 the senator’s claim of “unusual depth and precision 
in its definitions” is open to doubt. One question the proposal leaves 
unanswered is whether an official performs an act partly to further his own 
financial interest when he performs this act partly to encourage 
contributions to his re-election campaign. Another is whether he performs 
an act partly to further the financial interest of someone from whom he has 
received a thing of value when he performs an act partly to benefit a 
campaign contributor.  
The straightforward answer to these questions seems to be yes. 
Campaign contributions are cash, which, as Yogi Berra has observed, is just 
as good as money.51 In addition, spending campaign cash can enable a 
candidate to obtain a salaried position, something that unmistakably furthers 
his financial interest. And office holders may use campaign funds for 
purposes other than campaigning.  
State law on the use of campaign funds often tracks federal law, and 
since 1989, federal law has prohibited federal office holders, former office 
holders, and current candidates from using campaign funds to pay personal 
expenses.52 Candidates and former candidates may, however, donate these 
funds to charities without limit, to political parties without limit, and to 
political campaigns other than their own within limits. They also may use 
campaign funds to pay legal expenses if charged with official misconduct, 
to buy furniture and art for their offices, and to pay other expenses of 
official.” See Congressional Record, Feb. 2, 2012, 112th Cong., available at 
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/F?r112:3:./temp/~r1129FkULN:e256323: (emphasis 
added).  
50 Under the Leahy proposal, an official cannot engage in undisclosed self-dealing 
without knowingly violating a federal, state, or local law or regulation requiring the 
disclosure of a conflicting interest. When the predicate disclosure laws are sufficiently 
precise, officials can play it safe by complying with them. In Fort Wayne Books v. Indiana, 
489 U.S. 46, 58 (1989), the Supreme Court indicated that the due process clause requires 
no more. It held that, because a person could not violate Indiana’s RICO statute without 
also committing some predicate offense defined by another statute, the vagueness of the 
RICO statute itself did not matter. See id. at 58 (“Given that the RICO statute totally 
encompasses the obscenity law, if the latter is not unconstitutionally vague, the former 
cannot be vague either.”).  
The Supreme Court’s reasoning in Fort Wayne Books may not be entirely persuasive. 
Imagine a federal statute that forbids affecting interstate commerce by annoying others 
while violating any valid state law. 
51 See Yogi Berra, WIKIQUOTE,  http://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/Yogi_Berra (last visited 
Sept. 25, 2012) (noting Yogi Berra’s statement in an AFLAC commercial, “And they give 
you cash which is just as good as money”). 
52 See U.S. SENATE, SELECT COMMITTEE ON ETHICS, SENATE ETHICS MANUAL 154 
n.428 (2003).  
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campaigning and office holding.53 Officials have used these funds to enable 
their spouses to accompany them on work-related travel and to host 
extended gatherings at five-star resorts in Vail, Park City, Puerto Rico, Las 
Vegas, South Florida, and Bermuda. One member of Congress even has 
used campaign funds to pay herself 18% interest on loans from herself to 
her campaign.54 If people were asked outside the context of interpreting 
particular statutes whether officials further their financial interests and 
receive things of value when they obtain campaign contributions, most 
would find the question easy.  
Nevertheless, taking official action to encourage campaign contributions 
and to benefit the interests of contributors is, one suspects, extremely 
common. Straining to save members of Congress from their folly, to save 
other elected officials too, and to prevent every knowing failure to report a 
campaign contribution from becoming a felony more serious than 
manslaughter,55 courts might hold that the Leahy proposal does not make 
taking official action to encourage campaign contributions “self-dealing.”  
 
C.  Benefits Given to Friends and Relatives 
 
Taking benefits in the form of campaign contributions might or might 
not shield an official from prosecution for undisclosed self-dealing. 
Channeling benefits to the official’s spouse and others close to him, 
however, would preclude prosecution. Although taking official action to 
further the future financial interests of a spouse, minor child, or anyone else 
on the statutory list qualifies as self-dealing, acting to reward someone who 
previously has given something of value to a spouse does not. Unless the 
53 See id. at 154-55. 
54 See 60 Minutes: Washington’s Open Secret: Profitable PACs (C.B.S. Television, 
Oct. 20, 2013), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-18560_162-57608255/washingtons-open-
secret-profitable-pacs/; Eric Lipton, A Loophole Allows Lawmakers to Reel in Trips and 
Donations, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2014, at A1; Ken Silverstein, Beltway Bacchanal: 
Congress Lives High on the Contributor’s Dime, Harper’s Magazine, Mar. 2008, at 47; 
Dave Mann & Abby Rapoport, Lifestyles of the Corrupt and Elected: How Do Texas 
Legislators Live Large on their $7200 Salaries? Campaign Funds Pay for Lavish Perks 
and Personal Expenses, Courtesy of Special Interests, THE TEXAS OBSERVER, Jan. 16, 
2011, available at http://www.texasobserver.ord/cover-story/lifestyles-of-the-corrupt-and-
elected; Thomas J. Cole, Lawmakers Use Campaign Funds for Expenses, ALBUQUERQUE 
JOURNAL, Feb. 15, 2012, at A1; Adam Schwartzman, Joe Bruno, Other Pols Use 
Campaign Funds to Pay Legal Expenses, VILLAGE VOICE BLOGS, Sep. 3, 2010, available at 
http://blogs.villagevoice.com/runninscared/2010/09/joe_bruno_other.php.   
55 The maximum penalty for voluntary manslaughter under federal law is 15 years. See 
18 U.S.C. § 1112. The maximum penalty for mail fraud is ordinarily 20 years, but it 
becomes 30 years when the fraud affects either “a financial institution” or disaster-relief 
funds. See 18 U.S.C. § 1341.  
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official himself has received a thing of value from a benefactor, taking 
official action to advance the benefactor’s interests is permissible. 
Similarly, an official engages in self-dealing when he benefits anyone 
who has ever employed him or patronized his private business. He does not 
engage in self-dealing when he benefits someone who has employed his 
spouse or patronized the spouse’s business.  
 
D.  Benefits Given by Lobbyists and Other Friends 
 
A banker might host a legislator’s trip to an old golf course in Scotland, 
and the legislator then might vote in favor of bailing out the banking 
industry. Under the Leahy proposal, the legislator would have engaged in 
self-dealing. 
The situation would change, however, if the banker paid large sums to a 
lobbyist to urge subsidies for the banking industry and if the lobbyist then 
hosted the trip to Scotland without any prompting from his client.56 In this 
situation, the legislator could defend against a charge of self-dealing by 
showing that he did not act for the purpose in whole or material part of 
favoring the lobbyist’s financial interests; rather, he acted to benefit 
interests of the lobbyist’s client. And although the client paid the lobbyist’s 
fees, he did not provide the golf outing; he was in fact unaware of it.57  
Gimmicky offenses invite gimmicky defenses. Permitting a lobbyist or 
other “bagman” to provide benefits could defeat a charge of undisclosed 
self-dealing. 
Although legislators and other officials cannot avoid what the Leahy 
proposal calls self-dealing, a benefactor intent on corrupting an official 
probably could find ways around the proposal. Casting benefits in the form 
of campaign contributions might be enough, and if it were not, he could 
channel benefits to the legislator’s spouse or could hire a lavish lobbyist.  
 
E.  Advancing Financial Interests 
 
The Leahy proposal requires courts to distinguish between actions 
intended to advance benefactors’ financial interests and actions intended to 
advance their other interests. Awarding a job, a scholarship, a grant, a lease, 
a contract, a rate increase, or a commercial license usually makes a 
benefactor richer, and approving a zoning change usually does too.  
56 Cf. Wikipedia, List of Trips Funded by Jack Abramoff, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_trips_funded_by_Jack_Abramoff (last visited Nov. 13, 
2013). 
57 The client should avoid any conduct that might make him appear to be the source of 
the benefit provided—for example, reimbursing the lobbyist for the cost of the trip.  
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Approving a pardon for a benefactor, however, probably does not 
further the benefactor’s financial interest (although the benefactor’s release 
from prison might enable him to take a job and although the pardon might 
make him eligible for an occupational license). Approving a low-digit 
license plate, making an honorific award, or inviting a benefactor to stay 
overnight in the Lincoln bedroom probably does not advance his financial 
interest either (although status symbols and obvious friendship with 
important officials could contribute to a benefactor’s financial success). 
Approving a bridge sought by a benefactor probably would better his 
finances if the bridge improved access to his business, but it might not 
confer a financial benefit if the bridge merely made it easier for him to get 
home. The issue might be whether the bridge would reduce the benefactor’s 
expenditures on gas.  
 
F.  Proving Purpose 
 
The Leahy proposal makes an official’s purpose crucial. He must 
“perform an official act for the purpose, in whole or material part, of 
furthering or benefitting a financial interest” of a person or group on the 
statutory list.  
“Purpose” is more than knowledge; the word refers to an actor’s goal, 
desire, or conscious object.58 If a legislator were to support a bank bailout 
after accepting a trip to Scotland from a banker, the legislator might testify 
that furthering his benefactor’s financial interest was no part of his 
objective. Of course he understood that the bailout would advance the 
interest of his host, but the legislator’s only purpose was to prevent a 
collapse of the economy and thereby serve the public.   
Offering a defense like this one would make the merits and demerits of 
a challenged official action relevant. Did a lease, contract, grant, rate 
increase, or zoning change further the public interest, or was its purpose 
partly to feather a benefactor’s private nest? Members of Congress who 
bemoan the federal deficit and maintain that the federal justice system is too 
poor to afford trials to more than a small minority of defendants apparently 
have no qualms about requiring courts to rehash at length the pros and cons 
of official actions and the purposes that lie behind them.  
 
V. THE SECOND ELEMENT: NON-DISCLOSURE IN VIOLATION OF FEDERAL, 
STATE, OR LOCAL LAW 
 
58 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(a) (Proposed Official Draft 1962). 
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A.  Standing Federalism on Its Head 
 
The Leahy proposal incorporates the disclosure requirements of state 
and local law, perhaps because Congress was unwilling to do the hard work 
of devising uniform national standards, perhaps because it doubted that such 
standards would be constitutional,59 or perhaps because it simply had no 
idea what disclosure requirements to impose.  
Looking to state law, however, effectively moves trials for state 
regulatory violations into the federal courts and causes federal law to vary 
from state to state. In one state, the violation of a reporting requirement 
punishable only by private reprimand or public censure is transformed into 
a twenty-year federal felony. In a neighboring state, a failure to report the 
same information is no crime.  
Three states—Idaho, Michigan, and Vermont—require neither 
legislators nor executive branch officials to disclose any gifts or honoraria 
they receive.60 Officials in these states (including the state Senator Leahy 
represents, Vermont) might have little fear of prosecution for undisclosed 
self-dealing. Twelve additional states—Alabama, Connecticut, Iowa, 
Louisiana, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, New Mexico, North Dakota, 
South Dakota, Utah, and Wyoming—do not require legislators to disclose 
any gifts or honoraria they receive.61 
Courts and commentators have argued that interpreting the term “honest 
services” to incorporate state standards promotes federalism.62 In fact, it 
turns federalism upside down. Every state’s regulatory policy is a blend of 
prohibition, punishment, and forbearance. Federalizing a state’s substantive 
regulations without its accompanying penalty structure and enforcement 
mechanisms diminishes state power. When a federal court assumes the role 
of a state agency and punishes state violations much more severely than the 
state legislature and state administrative authorities consider appropriate, it 
deprives the state of the ability to govern itself. 
Just as Senator Leahy’s proposal makes violations of noncriminal 
59 See text at note infra.   
60 Caitlin Ginley, 50 States and No Winners, State Integrity Investigation (a project of 
the Center for Public Integrity, Global Integrity, and Public Radio International), available 
at http://www.stateintegrity.org/state_integrity_investigation_overview_story.  
61 National Conference of State Legislatures, Personal Financial Disclosure: Gift and 
Honorarium Requirements (updated Dec. 2011), available at 
http://www.ncsl.org/legislatures-elections/ethicshome/personal-financial-disclosure-gift-
and-honoraria.aspx. Many of these states do forbid the receipt of specified gifts and 
honoraria.   
62 See, e.g., United States v. Brumley, 116 F.3d 728, 734-35 (5th Cir. 1997) (en banc); 
George D. Brown, Should Federalism Shield Corruption? Mail Fraud, State Law and Post-
Lopez Analysis, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 225, 282-86 (1997). 
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regulations and fineable misdemeanors predicates for federal mail fraud 
charges, the mail fraud charges become predicates for RICO and money-
laundering charges.63 Predicates piled on predicates are wondrous tools.64 
 
B.  Leahy’s Paradox 
 
Casting aside state enforcement mechanisms and penalty provisions 
offends basic principles of federalism, and incorporating some parts of a 
state regulatory scheme but not others does too.   
States respond to what the Leahy proposal calls self-dealing in several 
ways. Sometimes they ignore it; sometimes they require its disclosure; and 
sometimes they prohibit it either by forbidding the creation of a conflicting 
interest (no official may accept a gift worth more than $50 from a 
lobbyist)65 or by requiring recusal when a conflict of interest arises (a 
legislator may not vote on a bill if the legislator owns or has any financial 
interest in a business likely to be substantially affected by the bill). The 
Leahy proposal makes self-dealing a federal crime only when a state has 
taken the middle path, regulating self-dealing by requiring disclosure. The 
proposal does not reach either the kind of self-dealing a state ignores or the 
kind it forbids—presumably the least troublesome and the most 
troublesome kinds.66  
Consider, for example, a state legislator who has not disclosed that his 
spouse owns a few shares of stock in an oil company and who votes to 
make a block of state land available for oil development. Under the Leahy 
proposal, this legislator’s fate would turn on his state’s laws. 
In State A, no law or regulation might require disclosure of a spouse’s 
stock holdings, and no law might require the legislator’s recusal. In State A, 
the legislator would be guilty of no crime, state or federal.  
In State B, a legislative rule might require a legislator to list in an annual 
report filed with his chamber’s committee on ethics all stocks that he and 
his spouse own. Violation of this rule could lead to public or private 
reprimand or censure. In State B, the legislator would have committed a 
major federal felony.  
In State C, a statute might declare that legislators may not vote on 
63 See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (RICO); 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(7)(a) (money laundering). 
64 Senator Leahy’s next book might be titled, Predicates Squared and Predicates 
Cubed: Turning Minor Misdemeanors into Fantastic Felonies in in Three Easy Steps. 
65 As noted above, several states do not require legislators to disclose the gifts and 
honoraria they receive but do forbid the receipt of some gifts and honoraria. See note 
supra. 
66 To be sure, a state may employ two or more regulatory strategies simultaneously. 
The fact that a campaign contribution is illegal, for example, does not excuse an official 
from reporting it. 
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matters substantially affecting enterprises that they or their spouses own in 
whole or in part. Violating this statute might be a criminal misdemeanor, 
but in State C as in State A, the legislator would be guilty of no federal 
crime. Respect for federalism could not explain this result, for State C 
would punish the legislator’s undisclosed self-dealing more severely than 
State B would. Under the Leahy proposal, engaging in self-dealing that a 
state prohibits is not a federal crime, but failing to report self-dealing that 
the state requires reported is a major felony.  
It would be fairer and more effective for Congress to draft a national 
code of conduct for state officials, telling them what gifts and campaign 
contributions they may accept, what gifts and campaign contributions they 
must disclose, and what conflicts of interest require them to disqualify 
themselves from acting. Such a code almost certainly would be 
unconstitutional, however,67 and even if it were not, it would depart from 
almost everyone’s sense of the appropriate division of state and federal 
authority. Although the fairer and more effective solution is unthinkable, 
incorporating some state laws but not others for no coherent reason and 
punishing violations of the incorporated laws much more severely than the 
states consider appropriate seems to command broad bipartisan support.  
67 See National Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (holding that 
Congress may not force states to approve substantial expansions of their Medicaid 
programs by threatening to withdraw federal funding from existing programs); Printz v. 
United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (holding that Congress may not force state law 
enforcement officers to conduct background checks of handgun purchasers); New York v. 
United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (holding that Congress may not force states either to 
accept ownership of radioactive waste or else to regulate it in accordance with federal 
instructions). In Garcia v. San Antonio Motor Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985), the 
Supreme Court overruled a prior decision and held, five-to-four, that Congress could enact 
a minimum wage law applicable to the employees of state and local governments. The 
federal government’s authority to assure minimum-wage parity among public and private 
workers, see id. at 554, does not suggest that it may direct the performance of state 
governments acting simply as state governments. 
Congress enacted the mail fraud statute pursuant to the postal power rather than any of 
the powers at issue in Sebelius, Printz, New York v. United States, and Garcia. But the 
authority “to establish post offices,” U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 7, surely does not include the 
power to promulgate a general code of conduct for state officials. Indeed, the thought that 
this power authorizes the federal prosecution of a state official for undisclosed self-dealing 
whenever any mailing by anyone is “incident to an essential part of the scheme,” see 
Schmuck v. United States, 489 U.S. 705, 712 (1989), takes one aback. If any of the 
Framers imagined that the postal power would enable Congress to police the ethics of state 
officials, he had more sense than to say so out loud.  
Some scholars have argued that Congress’s power and duty to guarantee each state a 
republican form of government, U.S. Const. art. IV, § 4, authorizes it to apply anti-
corruption legislation to state officials. See Adam H. Kurland, The Guarantee Clause as a 
Basis for Federal Prosecutions of State and Local Officials, 62 S. CALIF. L. REV. 367 
(1989).   
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C.  Federal, State, and Local Disclosure Rules: A Tangle 
 
Although public officials cannot avoid conduct that the Leahy proposal 
denominates self-dealing, the proposal punishes this conduct only when an 
official has knowingly failed to disclose “material information that is 
required to be disclosed by any Federal, State, or local statute, rule, 
regulation or charter.” A critical issue is the appropriateness of treating 
violations of federal, state, or local disclosure requirements as federal mail 
fraud. These requirements are often vague, prolix, hyper-technical, and 
under-enforced.68  
A New York commission concluded that the state’s Ethics in 
Government Act “mandates absurdly excessive financial disclosure 
requirements” for more than 70,000 employees.69 An ABA Committee on 
Government Standards spoke of “a complex and formidable rule structure, 
whose rationale is increasingly obscure and whose operation is increasingly 
arcane.”70 A director of the federal Office of Government Ethics 
complained, “[E]ven an employee who sincerely wants to follow the rules 
doesn’t have the remotest chance of understanding them.”71 
Abner Mikva, a former Member of Congress, former Chief Judge of the 
D.C. Circuit, and former White House counsel, declared, “[W]e already 
require the filing of too many forms. Every year all of our senior officials 
spend countless hours filling out countless disclosure forms. . . . The reports 
are so complicated that most reviewers can’t understand what they are 
reviewing, but they do serve as wonderful traps to snare the unwary 
68 The Illinois Governmental Ethics Act, for example, requires officials to disclose the 
economic interests of their spouses only when these interests are “constructively 
controlled” by the officials themselves. 5 ILCS 420/4A-102 (2012). In Stein v. Howlett, 
289 N.E.2d 409, 579-80 (Ill. 1972), the Illinois Supreme Court held that this language was 
not unconstitutionally vague but offered no hint of what it meant. 
Kathleen Clark has noted that “the Code of Federal Regulations contains over 130 
pages of regulations governing required financial disclosure, conflicting financial interests, 
receipt of gifts, honoraria and payment for teaching, limitations on outside earned income, 
restrictions on employees’ affiliation with law firms, rules governing current employees’ 
ability to negotiate for future employment, and restricting former employees’ employment 
options.” Kathleen Clark, Do We Have Enough Ethics in Government Yet?: An Answer 
from Fiduciary Theory, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 57, 61 n.13 (1996).  
69 New York State Comm’n on Govt. Integrity, Restoring the Public Trust: A Blueprint 
for Government Integrity, 18 FORDHAM URBAN L.J. 173, 191 (1990-91).  
70 ABA Comm. on Gov’t Standards, Keeping Faith: Government Ethics & 
Government Ethics Regulation, 45 ADM. L. REV. 287, 290 (1993).  
71 Jacob Weisberg, Springtime for Lobbyists, NEW REPUBLIC, Feb. 1, 1993, at 33, 38 
(quoting Stephen J. Potts).   
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official.”72 
Funding for the enforcement of disclosure requirements is sometimes 
close to nonexistent. In Delaware, a two-person Public Integrity 
Commission is responsible for enforcing the ethical rules applicable to 
48,000 public employees.73 
Even better funded agencies are likely to investigate only when they 
receive complaints, which they almost never do. In its sixth year, the 
Tennessee Ethics Commission had yet to penalize anyone.74  
The absence of effective enforcement can lead to frequent violation. The 
South Florida SunSentinel reported that, although Florida law required 
34,959 state employees to report the receipt of every gift worth more than 
$100, the number who reported any gift in 2008 was 385.75   
Perhaps Senator Leahy’s proposed federalization of state reporting 
requirements would prompt greater compliance with these requirements by 
state officials. More probably, however, federal prosecutors would charge 
failing to report self-dealing so rarely that compliance rates would not be 
greatly affected. Prosecuting violations of state reporting requirements 
would be simply a way to bring down officials believed on other grounds to 
be malefactors. Congress would have added another handy tool to the 
prosecutors’ overflowing kit. Sending prosecutor-picked malefactors to 
prison could become even easier (and perhaps more fun) than shooting 
gophers.  
 
VI. THE PROCEDURAL CONSEQUENCES OF CREATING ANOTHER FORM OF 
MAIL FRAUD 
 
The Leahy proposal makes undisclosed self-dealing a form of mail 
fraud rather than a separate crime. Because some courts had treated 
undisclosed self-dealing as mail fraud prior to Skilling, the mail fraud 
statute seemed to be where a prohibition of self-dealing belonged. 
Prosecuting this conduct as a separate crime, however, would be far less 
objectionable.76  
The kindest assumption is that the senator and his staff had no idea how 
72 Abner J. Mikva, From Politics to Paranoia: Misguided Ethics Laws Have Given Us 
More Mistrust, Not Less, WASH. POST, Nov. 26, 1995, at C2. 
73 See Ginley, supra note .  
74 See id.  
75 See Brian Haas, Hidden Influence: Gifts to Politicians and Officials Go Unreported, 
and Few Are Punished for it, Disclosure Records Suggest, S. FLORIDA SUNSENTINEL, Nov. 
29, 2009, at 1A.  
76 The suggestion is that Congress should make whatever it wants to punish a crime 
rather than one form of another crime. If Congress wished, the jurisdictional “hook” could 
remain placing something in the mail.  
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mail fraud prosecutions work. The following description draws heavily on 
the case of former Illinois Governor George H. Ryan, whom I represented 
in unsuccessful post-conviction proceedings, but many other cases resemble 
Ryan’s.77 By throwing a mass of undifferentiated charges of unattractive 
conduct into a churning cauldron, prosecutors undermine core procedural 
protections and invite jurors to judge the defendant’s character rather than 
his guilt or innocence of particular charges. 
Were the Leahy proposal to become law, prosecutors would charge 
corruption cases as they do today by alleging a single fraudulent scheme. 
The indictment would declare that the scheme began at or before the 
moment the defendant took office and ended when he left office or was 
arrested. It would allege that the objects of this scheme were to defraud the 
public of money and property, to deprive the public of the intangible right 
of honest services, and to engage in undisclosed self-dealing. The alleged 
scheme would have lasted for years. In the case of Governor Ryan, the 
scheme allegedly began when he was elected as Illinois Secretary of State 
and ended when he left the governor’s office twelve years later.78  
The bulk of the indictment would consist of paragraphs beginning with 
the words “it was a part of the scheme” or “it was a further part of the 
scheme.” Each of these paragraphs would recite unattractive conduct. The 
defendant might be said to have used state property for political purposes, to 
have awarded low-digit license plates to campaign contributors, to have 
favored friends and benefactors in the award of government contracts, to 
have accepted a secret political consulting fee, to have violated a campaign 
77 Before I was associated with the Ryan case, I published a short commentary on the 
unfairness of this prosecution. See Albert W. Alschuler, The Mail Fraud & Rico Racket: 
Thoughts on the Trial of George Ryan, 9 GREEN BAG 2D 113 (2006). 
78 The defendant might protest that the indictment was “duplicitous”—in other words, 
that it alleged many schemes, not just one—but he would probably lose. See, e.g., United 
States v. Caldwell, 302 F.3d 399, 408 (5th Cir. 2002); United States v. Morse, 785 F.2d 
771, 774 (9th Cir. 1986); United States v. Warner, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15727 at *67 
(N.D. Ill.) (the case of Governor Ryan and his co-defendant Lawrence Warner). Courts 
embrace the fiction that everything done during the defendant’s time in office was part of 
one grand plot. They treat a “scheme” as though it were a one-person conspiracy, 
borrowing precedents concerning the scope and duration of conspiracies without reflection. 
Ninety years ago, however, the courts took a more sensible view. See McClendon v. United 
States, 2 F.2d 660, 660-61 (6th Cir. 1924) (“[I]t has never yet been thought that the 
‘scheme to defraud’ . . . could be found in the mere succession of diverse swindles, 
unrelated save as they had a common stage.”).  
The pretense that all of the defendant’s conduct was part of a single scheme would 
guide the trial judge in ruling on pretrial motions and conducting the trial. At the end of the 
trial, however, the judge would perform a breathtaking feat of prestidigitation and shrink 
the scheme to almost nothing. He would solemnly instruct the jury, “Ladies and gentlemen, 
you need not find the scheme charged in the indictment. Discovering any tiny scheme 
anywhere along the way will be enough.” See text at notes infra.  
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pledge not to accept gifts worth more than $50, to have instructed a 
subordinate to be more pleasant to a campaign contributor, to have shared 
confidential government information with private advisors, and more. All of 
the rotten things people said about him when threatened with prosecution 
themselves would appear in numbered paragraphs. Some of the alleged 
misconduct would have violated criminal or civil regulations, and some 
would not. The indictment of Governor Ryan included all of the allegations 
listed in this paragraph. 
The allegations would not be listed under the headings “money-property 
fraud,” “honest services fraud,” and “undisclosed self-dealing.” The 
indictment would simply declare that they were all “parts of the scheme” 
and that the scheme included the three unlawful objects.  
After setting forth the alleged scheme for many pages, the indictment 
would charge several counts of mail fraud—each of them a mailing in 
furtherance of the unitary scheme. The mailings might be innocuous—for 
example, an election board’s mailing of a certificate of the defendant’s 
election to office.79  
The trial would continue for weeks or months as jurors heard 
descriptions of the defendant’s allegedly improper behavior. The jurors 
would react initially to the drip, drip, drip of evidence without having been 
instructed on the law.80 The trial of Governor Ryan lasted nearly six 
months. 
At the end of the trial, the judge would instruct the jury that the 
government need not prove all of the acts alleged to constitute the 
fraudulent scheme. Proving any act that established the elements of mail 
fraud would be enough. The issue presented to the jury would be whether 
any of the dirt thrown at the wall had stuck.81 
The defendant might or might not be entitled to an instruction that all of 
the jurors must agree on which act or acts the government had shown. He 
might or might not be entitled to an instruction that the jurors must agree on 
79 In the case of Governor Ryan, the alleged mailings did relate to particular aspects of 
the alleged scheme and did permit the jury to separate some aspects of the scheme from 
others. My guess, however, is that the prosecutors would not have written the indictment 
that way if they had considered the issue more carefully. They rarely took less advantage 
than the law allowed.     
80 Judge William Schwarzer compares the jurors’ experience to watching a baseball 
game without being told the rules of baseball until the game ends. William W Schwarzer, 
Reforming Jury Trials: The Role of the Jury in Civil Dispute Resolution, 1990 U. CHI. 
LEGAL F. 119, 129-30. 
81 See, e.g., United States v. Reicin, 497 F.2d 563, 568 (7th Cir. 1994), United States v. 
Toney, 598 F.2d 1349, 1355-56 (5th Cir. 1979); Anderson v. United States, 369 F.2d 11, 
15 (8th Cir. 1966).  
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which of the three kinds of mail fraud had been proven.82 Even if the trial 
judge were to give one or both of these unanimity instructions, no one 
would know whether the jurors followed them, which act or acts they 
considered proven, which act or acts they considered legally sufficient, and 
which theory or theories of mail fraud they employed. The defendant would 
not be entitled to special verdicts on any of these issues.83  
The jury would be unlikely to untangle the mass of evidence it had 
heard. Following the conviction of Governor Ryan, a newspaper reporter 
asked jurors which allegations had been most influential. Juror James 
Cwick replied, “There was a whole lot of stuff out there. You could pretty 
much take your pick.”84 He added, “Each box, each piece of evidence was a 
brick, and if you put all the evidence together, it was a house.”85 Juror 
Kevin Rein explained, “It wasn’t a smoking gun. I went into deliberations 
with a feeling something was probably not on the up-and-up—and after 5½ 
months [of trial] you have an idea.”86  
Patrick Collins, the chief prosecuting attorney, commented, “This case 
82 On the same day the Supreme Court reversed the conviction in Skilling, it reversed 
another conviction for mail fraud in Black v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2963 (2010). In 
Skilling, the trial court instructed the jurors that they must agree on which form of mail 
fraud the government established. In Black, no such instruction was given. See Jessica A. 
Roth, Alternative Elements, 59 UCLA L. REV. 170, 214 n.161 (2011).  
Many court of appeals decisions touch on whether jurors must agree about which 
alleged acts in furtherance of the supposed scheme the defendant performed or schemed to 
perform and which form of mail fraud the government established. None of the decisions, 
however, appear actually to resolve either of these issues. See, e.g., United States v. Joshua, 
648 F.3d 547, 553 (7th Cir. 2011); United States v. Lyons, 472 F.3d 1055, 1068-69 (9th 
Cir. 2007); United States v. Haber, 251 F.3d 881, 888-89 (10th Cir. 2001); United States v. 
Walker, 97 F.3d 253, 255 (2d Cir. 1996). 
The Supreme Court has supplied a hornbook rule that leaves the critical questions 
unanswered. “A jury in a federal criminal case cannot convict unless it finds that the 
government has proved each element” of an offense, but “a federal jury need not always 
decide unanimously . . . which of several possible means the defendant used to commit an 
element of a crime.” Richardson v. United States, 526 U.S. 813, 817 (1999).  
83 Whether to submit special interrogatories to the jury is left to the trial judge’s 
discretion, and judges have submitted them in some mail fraud cases. See, e.g., United 
States v. Joshua, 548 F.3d 547, 553-54 (7th Cir. 2011). Nevertheless, “[s]pecial verdicts in 
the criminal law are disfavored.” See, e.g., United States v. Townsend, 924 F.2d 1385, 
1413 (7th Cir. 1991); United States v. Roman, 870 F.2d 65, 73 (2d Cir. 1989); United 
States v. Collamore, 868 F.2d 24, 28 (1st Cir. 1989).  
84 James Janega & Tom Rybarczyk, Small Details Painted Picture of Corruption, 
CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Apr. 18, 2006, at C1.  
85 Susan Kuczka, Tom Rybarczyk & Ted Gregory, Inside the Ryan Jury Room: 
Cooped Up for Weeks, Strangers Became a Team, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Apr. 19, 2006, at 
C1. Cwick also observed, “The way I see things, I think I saw an up-close view of real life, 
how government works, how politics works.” Janega & Rybarczyk, supra note . 
86 Id. 
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was tried witness by witness, piece of evidence by piece of evidence, and it 
was only by looking at the totality of the case that the true picture could be 
shown to this jury.”87 It is no surprise that prosecutors describe the mail 
fraud statute as “our Stradivarius, our Colt 45, our Louisville Slugger, our 
Cuisinart.”88  
American courts ordinarily exclude “other acts” evidence. Although a 
defendant accused of purse snatching may have been convicted a dozen 
times of purse snatching, the jury will not learn of his prior convictions.89 
This evidence will be excluded because jurors should not be tempted to 
convict the defendant simply for being a bad person; they should judge the 
accusation of a particular wrongful act at a particular time.  
Mail fraud trials, however, are extended smear campaigns. They have 
something in common the “hooliganism” trials of the Soviet Union and the 
People’s Republic of China.90 These trials disgrace American justice, and 
Senator Leahy has found a way to make them worse. 
 
CONCLUSION: WHAT’S WRONG WITH CONGRESS? 
 
When a lawyer reviews a proposed will, trust, lease, statute, or other 
document, he typically asks whether the language of this document will do 
what it was intended to do, whether it will do things it was not intended to 
do, and whether it will be fairly and effectively implemented. No member 
of Congress and no staff member, however, seems to have adverted to the 
defects of the Leahy proposal described in this article. Although many 
people on Capitol Hill are law school graduates and members of the bar, 
there appear to be no lawyers there.  
The story this article has told about Senator Leahy’s proposal echoes 
87 Matt O’Connor & Rudolph Bush, Ryan Guilty: A Juror’s View, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, 
Apr. 18, 2006, at C1. 
88 Jed S. Rakoff, The Federal Mail Fraud Statute (Part I), 18 DUQ. L. REV. 771, 771 
(1980). 
89 See Fed. R. Ev. 404(b).  
90 China abolished the crime of hooliganism in 1997, but one defendant convicted of 
this crime remained in prison in 2011. See Quan Li, Lawyer Seeks Pardon for China’s Last 
Hooligan, ChinaDaily.com, Jan. 7, 2011, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2011-
01/07/content_11811269.htm. Russia still punishes hooliganism, see David M. 
Herszenhorn, Anti-Putin Stunt Earns Punk Band Two Years in Jail, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 17, 
2012, at A1, but the Russian statute proscribing hooliganism is more precise than the 
statute proscribing honest-services fraud in the United States. See Criminal Code of the 
Russian Federation, Art. 213 (defining hooliganism as “a gross violation of public order 
which expresses patent contempt for society, attended by violence against private persons 
or by the threat of its use, and likewise by the destruction or damage of other people’s 
property”), available at http://www.russian-criminal-
code.com/PartII/SectionIX/Chapter24.html.  
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the story of federal criminal law generally. It is a story of statutory sprawl—
of criminal statutes that reach well beyond the situations their authors 
apparently meant to address. Much, though not all,91 of this sprawl is 
attributable to Congress’s use of vague, overbroad, and difficult-to-limit 
language. The tale could be told not only of the Leahy proposal but also of 
the mail fraud statute, the honest services statute, the Mann Act, the Hobbs 
Act, the false statements statute, the Money Laundering Control Act, the 
Continuing Criminal Enterprise Statute, RICO, and many sentencing and 
forfeiture provisions. 
When federal criminal statutes sprawl out of control, Congress almost 
never reins them back. Cutting back would invite charges of depriving 
prosecutors of important tools and of not caring about particular forms of 
criminal conduct. Members of Congress understand how easy it is for 
opponents to make these charges and how difficult it is to respond. 
Moreover, members have little incentive to engage in good legislative 
housekeeping when they can score points by voting to add another flashy 
tool to the prosecutor’s kit. In the area of criminal justice, the only press 
good housekeeping is likely to get is bad press. 
Nearly 50 years ago, Congress approved and President Johnson 
appointed a bipartisan commission to draft a new federal criminal code. At 
the time, roughly two-thirds of the states recently had revised or were in the 
process of revising or their own codes to incorporate proposals offered by 
the American Law Institute’s Model Penal Code.92 The federal criminal 
code was less chaotic then than it is now, but then as now, it consisted of 
myriad ad hoc accretions to an archaic nineteenth-century core. After 
laboring for several years, the National Commission on Reform of Federal 
Criminal Law, headed by former Governor Edmund G. Brown of California, 
presented its draft in 1971.93  
Nearly everyone praised this draft. Then partisans on both sides of the 
aisle sought to improve it. Despite the draft’s uncontroversial core, it sank 
amidst disputes about the death penalty, the insanity defense, the protection 
of official secrets, and a few other issues.94  
The wrangling and posturing that torpedoed revision of the federal 
criminal code in the early 1970s occurred in a less partisan era than ours.95 A 
91 See Stephen F. Smith, Proportionality and Federalization, 91 VA. L. REV. 879, 884 
(2005) (“Far from being innocent bystanders in the federalization of crime, federal judges 
have been all too willing to construe federal crimes expansively.”).  
92 See MODEL PENAL CODE (Proposed Official Draft 1962). 
93 See FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON REFORM OF FEDERAL 
CRIMINAL LAW (1971).   
94 Louis Schwartz told the disheartening story in Louis B. Schwartz, Reform of the 
Federal Criminal Laws: Issues, Tactics, and Prospects, 41 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 1 (1977).  
95 See. e.g., MICKEY EDWARDS, THE PARTIES VERSUS THE PEOPLE: HOW TO TURN 
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comparable effort would be hopeless today.96 In 2011, even Senator Webb’s 
proposal to establish a bipartisan commission to study the criminal justice 
system—a proposal supported by groups as diverse as the National Sheriffs’ 
Association, the Fraternal Order of Police, the ACLU, and the NAACP—
failed to attract enough votes to overcome a Senate filibuster.97  
Congress’s hyper-partisanship may be the primary reason for its low 
approval ratings,98 and its undemocratic procedures may contribute to public 
disapproval as well. Republicans and Democrats were united in supporting 
the Leahy proposal, however, and no member of Congress opposed this 
measure publically. In the last Congress, only woefully undemocratic 
procedure kept this measure from becoming law. The majority leader of the 
House thwarted the will of an overwhelming majority of both houses and did 
so without explanation.   
Although a fiscal crisis may be bringing the era of mandatory minimum 
sentences and ever increasing prison populations to an end,99 the Leahy 
REPUBLICANS AND DEMOCRATS INTO AMERICANS (2012); Lee Hamilton, Why is Congress 
So Partisan?, Center on Congress at Indiana University, 
http://72.32.58.69/radio_commentaries/why_is_congress_so_partisan.php; Lugar Unloads 
on “Unrelenting” Partisanship, POLITICO, May 9, 2012, 
http://www.politico.com/blogs/on-congress/2012/05/lugar-unloads-on-unrelenting-
partisanship-122891.html; Olympia J. Snowe, How the Public Can Save the Senate, WASH. 
POST, Mar. 4, 2012, at A23; Alan I. Abramowitz & Kyle L. Saunders, Is Polarization a 
Myth?, 70 J. OF POLITICS 542 (2008). 
96 The Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security of the House 
Judiciary Committee did hold hearings on criminal code revision in 2011. See CRIMINAL 
CODE MODERNIZATION AND SIMPLIFICATION ACT OF 2011, HEARING BEFORE SUBCOMM. 
ON CRIME, TERRORISM, AND HOMELAND SECURITY OF THE H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 
112th Cong. (2011). It considered a proposed 1200-page codification that would have 
moved drug and immigration offenses currently set forth in other titles to Title 18, 
eliminated some duplicative provisions, provided uniform definitions of some 
inconsistently defined terms, used the word “knowingly” to describe the mens rea required 
for most malum in se offenses, and created general attempt and conspiracy provisions to 
punish attempts and conspiracies as severely as completed crimes. The measure did not 
offer the sort of comprehensive revision and simplification the Brown Commission 
proposed, and it has not been enacted.   
97 Mike Sacks, Jim Webb’s Criminal Justice Overhaul Commission Blocked Again in 
Senate, HUFFINGTON POST, Oct. 20, 2011, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/10/20/jim-
webb-criminal-justice-commission-blocked-senate_n_1022722.html; David Rogers, 
Republicans Block Justice Review Proposal in Senate, POLITICO, Oct. 20, 2011, 
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/1011/66491.html.  
98 See Sarah Dutton, Jennifer De Pinto, Anthony Salvanto & Fred Bakus, Views of 
Obamacare Improve, but are Still Negative Overall, CBS NEWS, Dec. 19, 2013, 
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/views-of-obamacare-improve-but-are-still-negative-overall/ 
(reporting that 10% of Americans approve of Congress’s performance while 83% 
disapprove).    
99 The federal prison population increased in 2012 but at lower rate than in earlier 
years. Nine states reduced their prison populations substantially. See Erica Goode, U.S. 
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proposal and its reception indicate that posturing on criminal justice issues 
is not over.100 A flaw as serious as political partisanship may be members’ 
lack of motivation to do quiet work that promises little or no political payoff 
(or to ensure that staff members do this work or to find academic and other 
lawyers willing to do it for free). 
I have been tempted on occasion to cast aside my accustomed role as a 
lawyer and to write a work of political theory with the title “Democracy 
Sucks.” Every mention of my thesis, however, prompts some sage to recite 
Winston Churchill’s line, “[D]emocracy is the worst form of Government 
except all others . . . .”101 Critics of my thesis apparently think only of 
monarchy, dictatorship, and hereditary aristocracy when they consider 
alternatives to democracy, and these alternatives are indeed worse.  
The Framers of the U.S. Constitution, however, fully embraced my 
thesis and pointed to a better alternative. On the first full day of the 
Constitutional Convention, Edmund Randolph declared, “None of the 
[state] constitutions have provided sufficient checks against democracy.”102 
Elbridge Gerry later told the convention, “The evils we experience flow 
from the excess of democracy.”103 James Madison wrote in Federalist 10 
that pure democracies were “spectacles of turbulence and confusion.”104 
Alexander Hamilton proclaimed that the ancient democracies “never 
possessed one feature of good government.”105  
The Framers never spoke of democracy without disparaging it, and the 
Constitution they drafted did not speak of it at all. Although this document 
provided for the direct election of members of the House of 
Representatives, it provided other means of selecting all other federal 
officials, including the President, members of the Senate, and justices of the 
Supreme Court. The Framers would have disapproved of a government like 
ours in which legislators “are essentially campaigning and raising money all 
the time.”106 They hoped to create a “mixed” system in which officials 
Prison Populations Decline, Reflecting New Approach to Crime, N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 
2013, at A11.  
100 Moreover, government corruption is a well chosen crime du jour. It stirs the 
resentful sentiments of almost everyone, including members of both the Occupy Wall 
Street and Tea Party movements. 
101 7 WINSTON CHURCHILL, W. S. CHURCHILL, HIS COMPLETE SPEECHES, 1897-1963 at 
566 (1974).   
102 1 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 at 26-27 (Max Farrand, ed., 
1911). 
103 Id. at 48.  
104 THE FEDERALIST No. 10 at 51-52 (James Madison) (J. R. Pole, ed., 2005). 
105 5 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 39 (Harold C. Syrett, et al., eds., 1961-
1987).  
106 See Anthony Corrado, Running Backward: The Congressional Money Chase, in 
THE PERMANENT CAMPAIGN AND ITS FUTURE 75 (Norman J. Ornstein & Thomas E. Mann, 
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would have enough distance from politics to consider the public good. 
When asked at the end of the Constitutional Convention what form of 
government the convention had approved, Benjamin Franklin is supposed to 
have said, “A republic if you can keep it.”107 Americans have not kept it.108 
Politicians hire expert consultants to determine how to push our hot buttons. 
They then push these buttons without much regard for how their proposals 
are likely to work in practice.     
 
 
 
 
 
 
eds., 2000). 
107 Papers of Dr. James McHenry on the Federal Constitution of 1787, 11 AM. HIST. 
REV. 595, 618 (1906).  
108 In the 1980s, a brief republican revival among legal scholars seemed to evaporate 
when critics noted that earlier republicans owned slaves, limited the franchise to male 
property owners, and were disagreeably elitist in a number of other ways. See, e.g., Linda 
K. Kerber, Making Republicanism Useful, 97 YALE L.J. 1663, 1668-89 (1988). My 
contemplated work of political theory would not embrace all of the Framers’ positions.  
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